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TERRITORIAL AND CUSTOMER
RESTRICTIONS IN FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
by Donald M. Jenkins*
Introduction-the Development and Significance of Franchising
T HE GROWTH OF FRANCHISING as a marketing vehicle in the
past decade has been apparent to the American consumer.
Several factors have contributed to this growth. This kind of
distribution system can be achieved with less capital outlay and
in a shorter time span than most other distribution systems
require. Some products and services gain greater consumer ac-
ceptance if they stand alone in the market place than when
they are co-mingled with other products. Wholesalers in certain
product lines, such as food and drugs, have found it necessary
to form voluntary chains based upon franchise agreements to
meet the competition of the big chains. Franchising, particularly
in the service field, enables a product or institution to achieve
an identity upon which a reputation for quality can be built.
These are a few of the reasons for the widespread use of
franchising.
Franchising has been described as a system of distribution
wherein a market supplier of goods or services grants particular
distribution rights to a limited number of selected businesses.1
The franchise may be granted to promote the marketing of a
product, products, or product line or to promote entire business
enterprises. This concept of franchising suggests two types of
franchising arrangements under which the grant of exclusive
territories or customer allocations may be included:
(1) Those that establish an efficient method of distribution
for the franchisor's product, such as those for cars or
bicycles.
* Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Akron.
1 E. Lewis and R. Hancock, Small Business Management Research Report,
The Franchise System of Distribution, 4 (1963).
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(2) Those that establish manufacturing or processing plants,
such as those for soft drink bottlers and mattress manu-
facturers. 2
The essence of franchising is the marketing of goods and
services through quasi-independent businesses that are subject
to various controls respecting their business operation. Two such
controls commonly included in franchise contracts are provisions
limiting the territory in which the product or service can be dis-
tributed by the franchisee and designating particular classes of
customers to whom the franchisee may sell. The potential
anti-competitive effects of these provisions produce antitrust
complexities. The Supreme Court of the United States in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Company3 expressed its position
on these restrictions in June of 1967. This article will review
the development of pre-Schwinn antitrust law affecting these re-
strictions, will evaluate the Schwinn decision, and will examine
proposed legislation concerned with territorial restrictions.
To get some perspective of the importance of the antitrust
law in this area, one must consider the significance of fran-
chising in our economy. The International Franchise Associa-
tion, a Chicago-based trade group, estimates that in 1966 fran-
chises, including service stations and automobile dealerships,
accounted for a retail value of seventy billion dollars worth of
goods and services. In addition, approximately eight billion dol-
lars worth of franchises were sold. These estimates suggest that
franchised distribution accounts for about eleven percent of the
Gross National Product.
Perhaps the significance of franchising can be better per-
ceived by examining specific industries and goods or services
utilizing the franchise method of distribution. The reports of
Professors Lewis and Hancock are revealing in this regard:
Since the beginning of the automobile business the major
proportion of all passenger cars and trucks have been sold
through franchised dealers. Practically all the major brands
of gasoline and oil are distributed through leased (fran-
chised) service stations. In addition to gasoline, these serv-
ice station operators sell vast amounts of the oil com-
panies' auto parts and accessories. Approximately 40 per-
cent of the nation's food is sold through food stores affiliated
2 Chadwell, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing & Franchising 63-64
(1966). These are two of three classifications discussed in this article.
3 388 U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct. 1856 (1967).
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with wholesalers by means of a franchise agreement. A
major proportion of agricultural machinery and its allied
lines are distributed through dealers selected and franchised
by farm machinery manufacturers. Tool and equipment
rental and auto and truck leasing fields have been and are
presently dominated by franchised dealers. The soft ice
cream business and many roadside light refreshment busi-
nesses are dominated or were originated by franchised or-
ganizations. Several well known home services, such as
carpet, rug and furniture cleaning were pioneered by fran-
chisors and today they have a sizable share of the market.
The recent development and growth of the coin operated
laundry and drycleaning field is almost entirely attributable
to franchising. Bottling companies are franchised businesses
and have been since the inception of the soft drink industry.
Splendid growth and expansion, all of high quality, is in
evidence in the hearing aid field, specialized restaurants,
inns, and motels and water-conditioning field. Each of these
is either dominated by franchised businesses or it has been
penetrated by the franchised way of doing business. 4
It is apparent that a substantial part of our economy, repre-
sented by a variety of industries, is affected by the interpretation
and application of the Sherman Antitrust Act,5 the Clayton Act,6
and the Federal Trade Commission Act7 as they apply to fran-
chising. A factor that should be stressed is that the size and
economic power of franchisors and franchisees encompasses a
spectrum from the large and financially powerful to the small
and marginally financed enterprises. Franchising often serves
the market requirements of firms faced with special competitive
problems and should therefore, it would seem, be encouraged
by federal legislation. However, franchising has sometimes been
used to stifle competition and to restrain trade and when so
employed obviously should be curtailed. The characteristic of
franchising that may promote competition or restrain it is the
control exercised by the franchisor over the franchisee. This con-
trol can extend from mutually beneficial cooperation to unlaw-
ful conspiracy.
Thus, franchising involves certain restrictions and a potential
for anti-competitive activities. The issue then is how much
franchise control is desirable and necessary from an antitrust
4 Lewis and Hancock, supra note 1, at 86.
5 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and 2 (1890).
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (1914).
7 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) 1914.
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point of view. This issue received the attention of the Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1965-1966.8 Subcommittee hearings culminated in the
summer of 1966 with consideration of a proposed amendment9 to
the Sherman Antitrust Act permitting exclusive territorial fran-
chises under limited circumstances. This legislation was pro-
posed when the legal status of exclusive territorial franchises
was in a greater state of uncertainty than it is today.
Case Background
Attention will now be given to the case background of ver-
tically imposed territorial and customer restrictions. The earliest
United States Supreme Court case directly touching on the
issue of territorial and customer restrictions was White Motor
Company v. United States,10 which was decided in 1963. In that
case White Motor Company was charged with violating Sections
one and three of the Sherman Act by imposing territorial re-
strictions on distributors and dealers as well as limitations on
the persons to whom the distributors could sell.1 White's
marketing plan gave an exclusive right to its distributors to
sell White trucks in a specified territory and prohibited the dis-
tributor from selling (or authorizing any dealer to sell) to any
department or political subdivision of the federal or state gov-
ernment unless expressly permitted to do so by the Company.
The government contended that these restrictions were per se
violations of the Sherman Act. The District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio agreed with the government's position and
granted a summary judgment for the government. White argued
that the territorial provisions of its franchise were necessary
to encourage initiative and that the territorial security granted
the distributor tended to enhance rather than reduce inter-
brand competition. White also contended that it was doing
nothing through its franchise arrangements that it could not do
8 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 1st
Session, Part 1 (1965), Parts 2 & 3 (1966). Hereinafter this will be cited
as "Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th
Congress").
9 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th
Congress, Part 3 (1966).
10 372 U.S. 253, 83 S. Ct. 696 (1963).
11 See E. Kinter, An Antitrust Primer, 266-67 (1964).
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by setting up its own retail outlets. The company defended
the customer restrictions by urging that the reserved customers
were large volume customers located where competition was
keen, that the volume purchased by these customers encouraged
discounting which only the manufacturer could afford, and that its
distributors were not competent to service such large accounts.
The Supreme Court, by a majority of five to three, held that
there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the Dis-
trict Court's decision that these vertically imposed restrictions
were illegal per se and directed the District Court to inquire into
the effect upon competition of the particular restraints in issue
and of the particular sanctions by which they were enforced.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan suggested guide-
lines to aid the District Court in making its inquiry into the
legality of the restrictions. Significantly, Justice Brennan indi-
cated that justification may exist for vertical territorial restric-
tions. For example, a manufacturer starting out in business or
marketing a new or risky product requiring close control may
have to insulate territories to gain effective access to the market.
Justice Brennan then stated that assuming justification can be
found for the restraint, the next step is to determine whether
the operation of the restrictions reasonably relates to the needs
that brought them about. Finally, inquiry should also proceed
into the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
Justice Brennan viewed customer restraints as the most in-
herently dangerous of the two kinds, since they serve to sup-
press all competition between the supplier and the distributor
and lack any countervailing tendency to foster competition be-
tween brands. He suggested that the crucial test of this type of
restraint is whether the distributor could, absent the restriction,
compete with the manufacturer for the reserved outlet. If not,
there would be no tendency to lessen competition if the restraint
were employed. Of course, if such were the case, there would
be much less incentive to use the customer restriction.
Addressing himself to White's attempts to justify the re-
straint on customers, Justice Brennan found White's arguments
quite shallow. Commenting on White's contention that the dis-
tributors were not competent to service the reserved accounts
without many months of specialized training, the Justice said
that less restrictive methods could accomplish the same end,
e.g. improved supervision and training of the distributors or a
5
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special manufacturer's warranty to protect the purchaser against
unsatisfactory distributors or servicing.
White's argument that the reserved large volume accounts
enabled it to compete more effectively with other brands im-
pressed Justice Brennan as constituting a reason why the re-
strictions were unjustified. If the distributor is not in a position
to compete, the restraint can only be explained as being used
to protect a noncompetitive pricing structure.
Justices Clark and Black and Chief Justice Warren dis-
sented. They viewed the business-necessity justification advanced
by White as invalid. The net effect of the restraint, in their
view, was to destroy competition between White and its dis-
tributors as to a given class of customers and to lessen com-
petition among White's distributors as to other accounts. They
also felt that such vertical restraints were as destructive of
competition as price fixing agreements and perhaps more ef-
fective than the latter, since territorial restraints are easier to
police. The dissenting justices viewed the White franchise agree-
ment as having the intention of eliminating competition and
likened it to horizontally imposed territorial restraints, which
are illegal per se. 12
The significance of the White case was that it disclosed that
a majority of the Supreme Court were not ready to declare
vertically imposed territorial or customer restrictions illegal per
se. The majority gave the impression that the test of legality
would be the reasonableness of the restraint and its effect on
competition. However, upon return of the case to the District
Court, White Motor signed a consent decree eliminating cus-
tomer and territorial restrictions from its franchise agreement,
and so a legal test for these restrictions was not clearly enun-
ciated.
Following the White decision, two cases concerning vertically
imposed restraints were decided at the Circuit Court level, Snap-
On Tools Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission's and
Sandura Company v. Federal Trade Commission.14
In the former case Snap-On Corporation assigned to its deal-
ers a non-exclusive franchise for the sale of its product within a
12 See Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States, 341 U.S. 593,
71 S. Ct. 971 (1951).
13 321 F.2d 825 (1963).
14 339 F.2d 847 (1964).
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described territory. The corporation's dealers distributed from
walk-on mobile trucks to customers in their territory. There
were approximately 900 dealers selling exclusively to the "me-
chanics trade" and non-exclusively to the "industrial trade,"
certain of these latter accounts being reserved to the company.
The Federal Trade Commission charged that Snap-On corpora-
tion was guilty of unfair acts and methods of competition in vio-
lation of Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
Commission issued a cease and desist order embracing both the
territorial and customer restraints. The company elected to ap-
peal. In considering the case, Circuit Judge Swygert referred
to the opinion of the Supreme Court in the White case, which
he interpreted as meaning that vertical allocations of dealer ter-
ritories were not per se violations of the Sherman Act; hence
an inquiry into the reasonableness of the arrangements was
necessary. A review of the characteristics of the pertinent
market revealed that regular calls on the "mechanics trade"
were a necessity. Also, in this market over eighty competing
concerns were engaged in a "bitter and bloody" interbrand
competition, and sound business judgment could not ignore this
fact in deciding whether to limit competition among intrabrand
competitors. Accordingly, the Circuit Court held that the terri-
torial and customer restrictions were reasonable, promoted inter-
brand competition, and being vertically imposed, were not un-
lawful.
Turning to the latter case, Sandura Company was also cited
by the Federal Trade Commission for engaging in unfair meth-
ods of competition under Section five of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. The condemned conduct consisted of making re-
sale price fixing arrangements and imposing territorial restraints
on distributors, which created closed territories. The Commis-
sion found both practices illegal and Sandura appealed that
part of the order relating to the territorial arrangements, which
the Commission asserted restrained intrabrand competition
among Sandura's distributors. The Sixth Circuit Court, again
citing the White case, refused to find the territorial restrictions
illegal for eliminating intrabrand competition without examining
into the restrictions' actual effect on competition and the facts
offered to justify the restraint. The court's evaluation of these
factors led to the conclusion that Sandura's methods were rea-
sonable. One consideration influencing the court was that
7
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Sandura was a relatively small concern losing business generally
to the "giants" of the floor-covering industry-Armstrong, Con-
goleum-Nairn, and Pabco. Also participating in the market were
large diversified firms such as Johns-Manville, Goodyear, and
Goodrich as well as several small firms. Another influential
consideration was the fact that Sandura had not devised the
closed territory system until a series of events placed the com-
pany on the edge of bankruptcy. Sandura had experienced
product difficulties in the early nineteen-fifties. Its annual sales
dwindled from seven million dollars to three million dollars and
its distributors fell into a state of low morale. The closed terri-
tories program was created to aid distributors, and after it was
instituted sales climbed back to a high of twenty-four million
dollars in 1959. As part of the franchising program, the distribu-
tors were made prominent participants in Sandura's promotional
program, and they contributed to the sales success. Given this
dependence upon the distributors for much of Sandura's adver-
tising program, and given the distributors' unwillingness to co-
operate without a quid pro quo of closed territories, the court
found sufficient justification for the territorial restraints, es-
pecially since the effect was to increase competition in the in-
dustry.
An evaluation of the above cases indicates that the courts are
reluctant to find territorial and customer restrictions illegal per
se. This is of special significance in view of the Justice De-
partment's long-maintained position that territorial restrictions
are illegal per se. The courts' position as of 1964 amounted to a
"rule of reason" approach to the restrictions and a willingness to
approve them as long as they were in fact: (1) vertically im-
posed; (2) justifiable by a sound business reason, such as the
need to achieve and maintain a market position, to enable a
company to enter a market, or to provide greater interbrand
competition and; (3) not unduly restrictive of competition in the
particular industry.
Quite apparent in these cases is the difference in the posi-
tions of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. In the White case the Justice Department proceeded under
its announced policy that territorial restrictions are illegal per se,
whereas the Federal Trade Commission in the Snap-On Tool
case and the Sandura case attacked the restraints on the basis
of their anti-competitive effect and assumed the burden of
proving the same, rather than asserting per se illegality.
Fall, 1968
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The consequences to the business community of the law
operative in this area should be noted. In the period 1956-1965
the government instituted twenty-seven suits involving restric-
tions upon territories or customers pursuant to franchise agree-
ments.' 5 Nineteen defendants signed consent decrees eliminating
the restrictions; two were fined twenty-five thousand dollars;
two were dismissed without prejudice; and four reached the
decisional stage at the Supreme Court level, of which only the
Schwinn case, discussed below, centered directly upon the verti-
cally imposed territorial and customer restrictions. The cost of
this litigation was emphasized by Judge Joseph Sam Perry, who
wrote the District Court opinion in the Schwinn case. Judge
Perry observed that Schwinn, as a pilot case, would cost in ex-
cess of one million dollars, about one-half of which cost would
be incurred by the defendants. The Snap-On Tool litigation, ac-
cording to Robert L. Grover, Executive Vice President of the
Company, consumed four years and cost the company a quarter
of a million dollars.16 Monte E. Pendleton, President of Sun-X
International, a franchisor, asserted before the Senate Sub-
committee that if his company were challenged by the govern-
ment it would simply have to relinquish the keys to its business,
since it could not afford to defend such charges. 17 Obviously,
clarification of the law in this field has been urgently needed.
Proposed Legislation
In June of 1966, the Senate Subcommittee held hearings
on Senate Bill Number 2549 known as the Executive Terri-
torial Franchise Bill. This legislation was introduced to amend
the Sherman Antitrust Act to provide that exclusive territorial
franchises would not be deemed to constitute a restraint of trade
or commerce or a monopoly or attempt to monopolize, under
limited circumstances. The text is set forth below:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) is amended
by adding immediately after section 8, the following new
section as section 9 thereof:
SEC. 9. For the purposes of the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, commonly referred to as the Sherman Antitrust
15 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th
Congress, Part 3.
16 Id. at 1123-26.
17 Id. at 65 (of Part 1).
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Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) and for the purposes of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) a contract or
agreement between a purchaser and a supplier restricting
the right of the purchaser to the distribution of the sup-
plier's product within a clearly delineated territorial area
shall not in and of itself be deemed to be an unfair method
of competition or a contract, combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice
in commerce or a monopolization or attempt to monopolize
where the product or products which is or are the subject
of such exclusive territorial franchise agreement or contract
are in free and open competition with products of like grade
and quality produced by persons other than the supplier,
and where the purchaser under such exclusive territorial
franchise agreement or contract is in free and open competi-
tion with other vendors of like or similar merchandise with-
in the territorial area defined by such agreement or con-
tract and is not inhibited by the terms of such agreement or
contract from dealing in like or similar products of persons
other than the supplier. s
Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, speaking for
the Department of Justice, opposed the bill, asserting that it
would lead to damaging restrictions on competition, would
legalize many harmful competitive agreements, and would sig-
nificantly increase the burden of enforcement agencies in at-
tacking insidious agreements in court.19
A shortcoming of the bill was pointed out by the Chief
Counsel for the Subcommittee, S. Jerry Cohen who observed
that if the act were taken literally a court might well reason that
if there is not free and open competition with products of like
grade and quality, a per se violation would result. To illustrate,
in the Sandura proceedings, Sandura had argued that its floor
covering was unique and, therefore, competition was not lessened
by the franchise provisions. Under the proposed bill this circum-
stance might well have resulted in Sandura losing the same case
it won without the bill.2o
Interestingly enough, the International Franchise Associa-
tion found the bill defective, for the following reasons: First, the
bill limits its exemption to franchise agreements under which
the franchisee is not inhibited "from dealing in like or similar
products of persons other than the supplier." This seems to deny
the.exemption to agreements wherein the franchisor requires its
18 Id. at 58 (of Part 1).
19 Id. at 1090 (of Part 3).
20 Id. at 1031 (of Part 3).
Fall, 1968
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franchisees to sell only its trade-marked product or service. Such
franchising agreements are necessary where uniformity of quality
and appearance is required. Second, the phrase "restricting the
right of the purchaser to the distribution of the supplier's prod-
uct within a clearly delineated territorial area" might not be in-
interpreted in the same manner as section three of the Clayton
monly found in franchise agreements. The purpose of this re-
striction is to disallow peripheral business outlets (in an as-
signed territory) which would encroach on the business of ad-
jacent franchisees. Thirdly, the language specifically covers
"products" and does not mention "services." If this language is
interpreted in the same manner as section three of the Clayton
Act, which also refers exclusively to "products," territorial fran-
chasing of "services" would not be exempted. 21
This legislation was pending when the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Company,2 2 considered for
the first time a case directly raising the issue of the legality of
vertically imposed territorial and customer restrictions.
The Schwinn Decision
The Schwinn case was decided in June, 1967. Filed on June
30, 1958, the case initially came to trial in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Divi-
sion. The United States brought the civil antitrust action against
Arnold, Schwinn and Company (a bicycle manufacturer), The
B. F. Goodrich Company, and the Schwinn Cycle Distributors
Association, alleging violation of section one of the Sherman
Act in that the defendant engaged in an unlawful combination
and conspiracy. The specific franchise agreements under attack
were the following:
(1) Schwinn franchised a limited number of retailers in
each market area for its products, and the Schwinn dis-
tributor in a particular market area confined its sales by
agreement to these retailers.
(2) B. F. Goodrich promised to confine its sales of Schwinn
products to B. F. Goodrich outlets only.
(3) The franchised dealers agreed to adhere to retail prices
fixed by Schwinn.
21 Id. at 1077-79 (of Part 3).
22 388 U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct. 1856 (1967).
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(4) The contracts provided that franchised retailers and
B. F. Goodrich outlets that failed to adhere to said
prices would be refused future deliveries of Schwinn
products.
(5) The franchised retailers agreed to purchase Schwinn
products only from the authorized Schwinn distributor
in their market area and to sell only from the franchised
location.
The challenged marketing program was begun in 1952 when
Schwinn enjoyed approximately 22.5 percent of the domestic
bicycle market. By 1961, its share had dropped to 13 percent al-
though its unit sales and dollar volume had increased sub-
stantially. In 1962 nine bicycle manufacturers in the United
States supplied 70 percent of the market. Murray Incorporated,
the leading producer, supplied 23 percent of the domestic mar-
ket. Of the total domestic sales, 40 percent of the bicycles were
distributed by national concerns which operated their own stores
and franchised others. Another 20 percent were sold by giant
chain stores, such as Sears-Roebuck and Montgomery Ward.
About 30 percent were sold by cycle jobbers, and the balance
were marketed by hardware and general stores. Although
Schwinn sold only under its name, the company's policy did not
prohibit its distributors or retailers from handling other lines,
and most did deal in multiple lines. The government did not con-
tend that there was any restraint on interbrand competition but
rather that the agreements restricted intrabrand competition.
In essence the complaint asserted that this arrangement, which
affected but one-seventh of the market, constituted an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.
Schwinn's channels of distribution were as follows:
(1) Sales were made directly to distributors, to B. F. Good-
rich, and to hardware jobbers.
(2) Sales were made to franchised retailers under the
so-called "Schwinn Plan." Schwinn would ship directly
to the retailer, invoice him directly, extend credit, and
pay a commission to the distributor taking the order.
(3) Sales were also made to retailers by means of consign-
ment or agency arrangements with their distributors.
In the 1952-1962 period approximately 50 percent of the
company's sales were made under the "Schwinn Plan." By the
time the Supreme Court considered the case about 75 percent
of all Schwinn's sales were made under this plan.
Fall, 1968
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The Schwinn retail franchisees were required to promote
Schwinn bicycles and to give them at least equal prominence
with other brands. The number of outlets in a given area were
limited and the retailer was franchised only as to a designated
location. His sales were restricted to consumers.
The District Court rendered its judgment in a lengthy
opinion on December 29, 1964, almost two years after the Su-
preme Court's decision in the White case. The Court found that
the government had failed to prove that the company was guilty
of a price fixing scheme, and this charge was dropped on appeal.
Further, the court held that the Schwinn franchising system
was fair, reasonable and good business procedure under all the
circumstances existing in the bicycle industry and that the com-
pany should be allowed to continue developing more efficient
territorial zones and to continue allocating specific territories to
distributors for prime responsibility. 23 However, the court held
the defendants in violation of Section one of the Sherman Act
to the extent that territorial restrictions were placed on distribu-
tors who purchased outright Schwinn products (as opposed to
distributors who acted as agents or consignees). Such restric-
tions were characterized as illegal per se. The company did not
appeal this decision. The District Court did not declare unlaw-
ful the customer restrictions.
The government elected to appeal the upholding of territorial
and customer limitations under consigned and agency distribution
23 Judge Perry stressed the dilemma of the relatively small business or-
ganization as it views a market place dominated by giants:
"To put it bluntly, if Schwinn were Sears, Roebuck & Co., its largest
bicycle competitor, or if it were General Motors Corp., it would be able
to do exactly what it has done in franchising retail dealers with no
penalty attached, either through its own retail stores and salesmen as
Sears, Roebuck & Co., does or through direct franchising on a nation-
wide scale as General Motors and other giant corporations do.
And penalized for what? Being a pygmy, compared to its giant bicycle
competitors, Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Montgomery Ward & Co.? . . .
Now it appears to this court that if General Motors, Sears, Roebuck &
Co., Montgomery Ward & Co., Ford Motors Co., and other international
corporations can rely upon a sound and long-established principle of
common law and safely choose its customers, deal, and refuse to deal,
with whomsoever it will, and wherever it will, so can a small busi-
ness firm such as Schwinn. There is another rule of law laid down
and established at common law just as firmly as the aforesaid principle,
and corollary to it: That is the rule of common law that generally what
one may do himself he may likewise do by or through an agent. As
a matter of fact and law that is how General Motors acts-by an
officer. Now that is also what Schwinn has done. In place of acting
through a vice president, it has acted through a distributor." 339 F.2d
at 112.
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arrangements. However, it did not contend in the Supreme Court
that such distribution methods were illegal per se but argued
that in the light of the "rule of reason" the limitations consti-
tuted an unreasonable restraint of trade. It urged that such
restraints should be proscribed regardless of the technical form
in which the goods were transferred.
Schwinn was argued before the Supreme Court in April,
1967. The White, Sandura, and Snap-On Tool decisions indicated
that the restrictions under consideration would be tested against
a criteria of reasonableness and not condemned as illegal per
se. As expected, the Supreme Court examined the specifics of
the challenged practices and their impact on the market place
to determine the reasonableness of the restraints. The company
maintained that it evolved the distribution system to enable it
and the small independent merchants, represented by their
franchisees, to compete more effectively. The court discounted
as a basis for reasonableness Schwinn's "good business practice"
arguments and asserted that the point in inquiry was whether, as-
suming non-predatory motives and blameless business purposes,
the effect on competition in the market place was substantially
harmful.
The government argued that it was illogical to forbid ter-
ritorial limitations on the resale activities of distributors and at
the same time to condone arrangements which require distribu-
tors to confine the resale of goods to franchised retailers. Such
an agreement includes a combination or understanding that vio-
lates the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court agreed with this
argument and held that upon remand the decree should be
modified to enjoin any such limitation on resale by the distribu-
tor.
In addition, the government argued that to effectively con-
trol such practices the decree should encompass the agency and
consignment arrangements used by Schwinn in their distribution
system. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished these dis-
tribution practices by viewing the restraints achieved as being
purely unilaterally and vertically imposed by Schwinn, the title-
holder of the goods. The issue, as expressed by the court, was
the extent to which a manufacturer may choose his customers,
allocate territories for resale, and confine access to his goods
to selected, franchised retailers. Hence, a distinction was made
between a distribution system wherein the manufacturer parts
Fall, 1968
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with title, dominion over the goods, and risk of loss and a system
under which the manufacturer retains ownership and risk of
loss.
The District Court, therefore, was upheld in its holding
prohibiting as illegal per se territorial limitations where distribu-
tion is accomplished through purchase and sale. The Supreme
Court extended the per se doctrine to cover the restricting of
outlets with whom a distributor may deal and to cover the desig-
nating of classes to whom retailers may sell after the franchisor
has parted with title to the goods. In effect, the Court stated
that if a manufacturer parts with dominion and control over his
product or transfers the risk of loss to another, he may not
thereafter reserve control over the product's destiny or the con-
ditions of resale. Any such attempt is illegal per se.
As to agency and consignment methods that effect territorial
and customer restrictions, it was held that such restraints are
not per se violations but may be prohibited by the Sherman
Act if their impact is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition.
Regarding Schwinn specifically, the Court held that, absent the
price fixing issue, which was not a subject of appeal, the re-
straints were unobjectionable, since: their anti-competitive
effects were negligible; the defendant was faced with intense
competition by mass merchandisers; and adequate supplies of
similar products were available to non-franchised dealers.
The main points advanced by the Supreme Court in sup-
port of its opinion were these:
(1) Competitive bicycles were available to distributors and
retailers.
(2) Schwinn's distributors and retailers could handle other
brands of bicycles.
(3) The restrictions imposed by Schwinn were found by the
trial court to be no more confining than necessary to
meet competitive pressures. Thus the net effect of the
plan was to promote competition.
Judges Stewart and Harlan dissented in the ruling that the
restrictions concerning items of purchase and sale were a per se
violation. They cited the White case and its formulation of the
"rule of reason" test of territorial and customer restraints. They
argued that facts peculiar to the business, the competitive factors
before and after the restraint, the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons for adopting a particular restraint are all factors
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to be considered. In their opinion, the finding of a per se viola-
tion in this case ran counter to the Court's pronouncement in the
White case and ignored the fact that the restrictions did not
appear to suppress competition. The dissenters were especially
critical of the majority's position that the restrictions violated
the "ancient rule against restraints on alienation." Ancillary
restraints on alienation, they emphasized, were recognized as
legitimate as early as 1711 under the common law, and in any
event the vast change in society's economic life since the "ancient
rule" was pronounced vitiates this argument.
The Need for Territorial and Customer Restraints
In order to properly evaluate the impact of the antitrust
laws under discussion one must be aware of the trend toward con-
centration of economic power in our society. Mergers have oc-
curred at a rapid rate in the past ten years with relatively little
interference from the federal agencies. To cite two examples
involving popular consumer products, the brewing industry has
experienced a fifty percent decrease in the number of operating
breweries since 1950. Distributors in the industry have de-
creased approximately 32 percent in the same period. In 1965,
the five leading breweries supplied 41 percent of the market.
The top twenty breweries provided beer for 84 percent of the
market, leaving the remaining 16 percent of the market place
to approximately 180 breweries.2 4 Another industry evidencing
this concentration is the cigar industry, where the number of
manufacturers decreased from 1,821 in 1950 to 336 in 1965, with
the top eleven manufacturers supplying eighty percent of the
market.2 5 These examples illustrate the trend towards greater
concentration. The significant factor is the tremendous market
power that is being achieved through this concentration of eco-
nomic power. For the smaller, financially weaker firms to meet
this competition is becoming increasingly difficult. At present
there is no reason to believe that the federal agencies will take
any significant steps to deter further concentration or to elimi-
nate existing economic concentration. As indicated earlier, many
businesses have selected the franchise system of distribution
simply to survive the competition offered by the "giants" in their
24 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th
Congress, p. 4 of Part 1.
25 Id. at 511 (of Part 2).
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industry. Market control is an essential element of their com-
petitive program. Territorial and customer restrictions, when
so employed, may have pro-competitive effects, as illustrated in
the Sandura case. If territorial and customer restrictions are
deemed illegal per se where distribution is through purchase
and sale, a franchisor is foreclosed from showing that a system
of closed territories is a necessary inducement to obtain loyal
distributors who will enable him to compete effectively against
the "giants" in the industry. Eugene P. Foley, Administrator of
the Small Business Administration, highlighted this point in his
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly:
"Over the years the courts have developed the doctrine that
certain practices are so pernicious in their effects on com-
petition, and so lacking in any redeeming virtue, that they
are conclusively presumed to be illegal.
Among the practices so condemned are agreements among
competitors to fix prices; to establish production or sales
quotas; or to allocate territories or customers. Where all or
most of the participants to such practices are large con-
cerns, the per se approach seems to make sense. But does
it make sense where a group of small businesses in an in-
dustry resort to such practices for the purpose of strengthen-
ing their position against the two or three firms, say, which
dominate the market? Should we refuse even to consider
the possibility that the net result was to increase, rather
than decrease, competition in the industry? That it was
beneficial, rather than injurious, to the economy? . . .
. . . In particular I am concerned with the argument, some-
times heard, that it is per se illegal for a franchisor to al-
locate exclusive territories to his franchisees and to pro-
hibit each from invading the area of another." 26
An undesirable effect of the decision in the Schwinn case is
its encouragement of vertical integration, which generally is
only within the capability of the better financed organizations.
If franchisors are frustrated in their attempts to control their
franchisees even where there is no significant adverse effect on
competition, their most rational alternative course of action
is to integrate forward-to the detriment of their small competi-
tors. Justice Douglas, in Standard Oil of California v. United
States,27 predicted such a result if unrealistic limitations on trade
restrictions were imposed.
26 Id. at 985 (of Part 3).
27 337 U.S. 293, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
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It is difficult to justify the sanctioning of vertical restraints
where distribution is by agency or consignment arrangements
and the simultaneous condemnation of such restraints where
distribution is by purchase and sale. When they deem such con-
trol advisable the large manufacturers will simply integrate
forward or else employ an agency arrangement and willingly
assume the heavy financial burdens and risks associated with
ownership of the products. Neither of these alternatives is avail-
able to the small manufacturer. Furthermore, the formal dis-
tinction made between these two methods of distribution ap-
pears to constitute a very tenuous basis upon which to con-
done or outlaw these restrictions. The Supreme Court itself
rejected such a formal distinction in 1964 in Simpson v. Union
Oil Co. 28
Conclusion
Today the imposition of territorial or customer restrictions
by the franchisor is illegal per se if distribution of the product
is by purchase and sale. However, if the franchisor retains title
to the goods through the channels of distribution by employing
agency or consignment agreements, such restrictions will be
judged by the "rule of reason," and will be deemed unlawful
only if the proscribed adverse effect on competition is apparent.
One questions whether the present law gives due con-
sideration to the realities of the market place. The major ad-
vantage of the illegal per se concept in judging trade practices
is, of course, the ease with which it can be applied. This is
helpful to the government and provides definite guidelines to
business. On the other hand it obviously can be too exclusive.
It is submitted that the wide spectrum of business entities in our
economy and the avowed purpose of the antitrust laws to en-
courage competition preclude applying the per se concept to ter-
ritorial and customer restraints. Even the Justice Department,
which has had an inflexible attitude toward these restrictions,
has acknowledged that under certain circumstances such re-
straints may be lawful. 29
Besides making possible the entry of new firms and the in-
troduction of new products territorial and customer restrictions
can also be useful in circumstances involving unusually high
risk or prolonged business reverses. The use of these restraints
28 377 U.S. 13, 84 S. Ct. 1051 (1964).
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enabled the Sandura Company to escape from the edge of bank-
ruptcy. Companies such as Schwinn and White Motor, engaged
in unequal competition with commercial giants, may withstand
intense interbrand competition by employing customer and terri-
torial limitations. Snap-On Tools found them necessary to avoid
the waste and destructiveness of intrabrand competition in an
already extremely competitive market place.
It appears that a return to the current of the law before
the Schwinn decision would be in the best interest of society.
The Sherman Act proscribes attempts to monopolize and to
establish unreasonable restraints of trade. It is these criteria
that should be applied in determining the legality of territorial
and customer restrictions. This was the conclusion reached in
1955 by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws. 30 If it is found that the restraint is merely ancil-
lary to a legitimate business purpose it should be upheld unless
its effect is to unreasonably stifle competition. To the argument
that such legal guidelines are too indefinite one can reply that a
degree of indefiniteness is preferable to the outright prohibition
of rational trade practices that often promote competition. In
brief, territorial and customer restrictions should be tested by
the "rule of reason."
29 Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Anti-
trust Division, declared, in an address to the New York Bar Association
Antitrust Symposium in 1966:
"Without pretending to be exhaustive or definitive, let me deal briefly
with the question 'Are territorial restrictions more restrictive than
necessary to achieve any legitimate purpose?' We have been studying
this matter for some time, and I am frank to say that so far I am not
convinced that territorial restrictions are reasonably necessary to any
legitimate purpose save for one case, that involving the entry of new
firms and/or the introduction of new products. These are commonly
associated with relatively high degrees of risk and uncertainty, and it
is not unreasonable to suppose that territorial restrictions may be neces-
sary in many of such cases to induce dealers to make the investment
necessary to get the manufacturer's new product effectively intro-
duced . . ."
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Con-
gress, pages 1021-22 (of Part 3).
30 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws 29 (1955).
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